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CORPORATE LAW
INTRODUCTION
During this survey period,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit twice addressed the issue of piercing the corporate veil.
In the first of these cases, Floyd v. Internal Revenue Service,2 the court
addressed a reverse piercing argument presented by the IRS, in which the
IRS sought to liquidate corporate assets to satisfy the tax obligations of
an underlying owner. The second case, National Labor Relations Board
v. I. W. G., Inc.,' presented the court with the issue of veil piercing in the
context of an administrative agency holding a shareholder liable for the
corporation's evasion of specific legal obligations. Part I of this survey
examines the general theory of veil piercing. Part II provides a similar
background on reverse piercing and focuses on the Tenth Circuit's judi-
cial interpretations of this doctrine. Part III examines the specific sce-
nario where the corporate veil is reverse pierced on the grounds that an
entity used the corporate form to evade specific legal obligations.
I. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: BACKGROUND AND THEORY
One of the most fundamental features of the corporate form is lim-
ited liability.! Recognizing that a corporation is a "distinct legal entity,"
separate from the persons comprising it, limited liability provides that
shareholder liability shall be limited to the shareholder's investment in
the corporation.' Thus, limited liability effectively encourages investment
in high-risk ventures which otherwise might endanger the personal
wealth of those providing capital.!
Limited liability, by its very operation, restricts the assets from
which creditors may seek repayment when the corporation is in bank-
ruptcy, default, or must subsequently satisfy legal judgement. When the
available assets are inadequate to satisfy the claims of creditors, those
creditors often seek to pierce the corporate veil-asserting the theory of
inappropriate use of the corporate form to recover directly from share-
I. This survey period is from September 1, 1997 to August 31, 1998.
2. 151 F.3d 1295 (l0thCir. 1998).
3. 144 F.3d 685 (10th Cir. 1998).
4. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 130 (3d ed. 1983).
5. Huard v. Shreveport Pirates, Inc., 147 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting, further, that
piercing is a radical remedy warranted only in exceptional circumstances such as fraud or deceit).
6. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON Er AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 241 (2d ed. 1988).
7. See Huard, 147 F.3d at 409; see also LEWIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN R. PALMITER,
CORPORATIONS 70 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that limited liability exists because it facilitates (1) capital
formation, (2) desirable management risk-taking, (3) broad based investment diversification, and (4)
public stock trading markets).
8. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1036, 1039-40(1991).
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holders or officers." Unsurprisingly, veil piercing claims have become the
most litigated area in corporate law.'" Nevertheless, the legal standard for
determining when to set aside "the corporate veil is notably imprecise
and fact-intensive.""
Courts typically require a showing of two elements before piercing
the veil.'" The first element looks at excessive unity of interest' 3-
whether the shareholders exert excessive control over the corporation."
Courts applying this first element often utilize concepts such as
"alter ego" or "mere instrumentality," to support piercing the veil." The
9. See generally 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CoRPORATIoNs § 41 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (explaining that practically all authorities
agree that under certain circumstances the corporate form should be disregarded "in the interest of
justice in such cases as fraud, contravention of law or contract, public wrong, or to work out the
equities among members of the corporation internally and involving no rights of the public or third
persons").
10. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 1036.
11. Crane v. Green & Freedman Baking Co., 134 F.3d 17,21 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating also that
"no hard and fast rule as to the conditions under which the [corporate] entity may be disregarded can
be stated as they vary according to the circumstances of each case"). The Louisiana Court of Ap-
peals presented the quandary succinctly when it noted that as a balancing test, the same factual
scenario may lead to differing results depending upon the competing policies behind recognizing the
corporate form and the policies justifying piercing. See Middleton v. Parish of Jefferson, 707 So.2d
454, 457 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Glenn G. Morris, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52
LA. L. REV. 271,276 (1991)).
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1054 (10th Cir. 1993)
(examining the District of Columbia Circuit Court's approach which analyzes the degree of adher-
ence to corporate formalities and whether recognition of the corporate structure would be inequita-
ble) (citing Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see also Note, Piercing
the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 853,
854-55 (1982).
13. See Note, supra note 12, at 854.
14. See, e.g., Huard v. Shreveport Pirates, Inc., 147 F.3d 406, 414 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that
"the corporate veil should only be pierced with respect to contract claims when compelling equitable
considerations favor this remedy; otherwise, courts are not to disturb the allocation of risks estab-
lished by the parties"); see also Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1296 (10th Cir. 1998); Franklin A.
Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift he Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of
Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REv. 853, 854-55 (1997). In its analysis, a court will likely
ask whether an excessive degree of unity exists among the entities. See BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW §§ 6.02-.06, 10.03 (1987) (addressing "instrumentality,"
"alter ego" and "identity" doctrines); see also Bergesen v. Lindholm, 760 F. Supp. 976, 987-88 (D.
Conn. 1991) (comparing the instrumentality and identity rules).
15. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 195 (3d ed. 1992). Whether the "alter ego"
and "mere instrumentality" concepts are subdivisions within the veil piercing doctrine, or provide
independent grounds for liability is disputed. See id.; cf., e.g., Massachusetts Carpenters Cent. Col-
lection Agency v. Belmont Concrete Corp., 139 F.3d 304, 308 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a foreign company through veil piercing required fraud, while in
contrast, wrongful motives were not required in this ERISA action which utilized the alter ego
doctrine). Additionally, the court stated that "the policies generally served by various corporate veil
piercing approaches, address different interests than does the alter ego doctrine." Id. at 308 (citation
omitted); cf. Crane, 134 F.3d at 22 (utilizing a different, less rigid test, the federal common law
standard adopted by the First Circuit, to evaluate an ERISA plaintiffs veil piercing claim); Futura
Dev. of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Estado Libre Asociado De Puerto Rico, 144 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1998)
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second element looks at inequitable injury to creditors as a result of the
unity between corporation and shareholder." This examination may re-
quire consideration of fraudulent intent and the degree of injustice im-
posed through recognition of the corporate form."
Generally, the term "alter ego" indicates that the corporation is in-
distinguishable from the shareholder.'8 As the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals stated, "[tlo call corporations alter egos is to say that they are
one-that a single business uses a variety of corporate names and char-
ters but is still just one entity."'" In 1931, Frederick J. Powell formulated
a checklist for use in determining whether a subsidiary corporation con-
stitutes the "alter ego" of its parent.' Today, courts commonly rely on
numerous factors derived from Powell's list in the veil piercing analysis.'
(refusing to expand jurisdiction to include an alter ego claim, the court held the alter ego claim was
not merely a factual determination that identifies an original judgment debtor). These cases distin-
guish between generic veil piercing claims and alter ego claims, but find both are part of the same
doctrine, involving a substantive rule of liability.
16. See, e.g., Bufco Corp. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 964,969 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Greater Kansas City
Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052; Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309, 1311-12 (7th Cir.
1993); White Oak Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 732, 732 (1995). Jurisdictions using the three-prong test
require proof that both fraud and injustice would result from recognition of the corporate form. See
Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1054. In contrast, courts utilizing the two-prong test require
proof that either fraud or injustice would result from recognition of the corporate form. See id. at
1052. The former, at least theoretically, leads to a more difficult burden of proof to sustain. But (;f
id. (minimizing the significance of this difference).
17. See Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052; cf, e.g., Crane, 134 F.3d at 22 (quoting
Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986)). Under both tests, variations exist on the enumeration
of such elements. For example, in Middleton v. Parish of Jefferson, 707 So.2d 454, (La. Ct. App.
1998), the court stated that the two-part test is met if
(1) the corporation is an alter ego and has been used by the shareholder to carry out some
sort of fraud or (2) even in the absence of fraud, the shareholder has failed to conduct
business on a "corporate footing" to such an extent that the corporation has become in-
distinguishable from the shareholder.
Id. at 456-57. On the other hand, the Second Circuit, in Thrift Drug, Inc., v. Universal Prescription
Administrators, 131 F.3d 95, (2d Cir. 1997), held that piercing the corporate veil under New York
law requires a showing "(i) that the owner exercised complete domination over the corporation with
respect to the transaction at issue; and (ii) that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong
that injured the party seeking to pierce the veil." Id. at 97.
18. See Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052.
19. United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1998).
20. FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF A
PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY 9 (1931). The factors included:
(a) The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of the subsidiary.
(b) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers.
(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or other-
wise causes its incorporation.
(e) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or losses of the subsidiary.
(g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corporation or no
assets except those conveyed by the parent corporation.
(h) In the papers of the parent corporation or the statements of its officers, the subsidiary
is described as a department or division of the parent corporation, or its business or finan-
cial responsibility is referred to as the parent corporation's own.
(i) The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its own.
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The "mere instrumentality" concept is similar.' Courts may disre-
gard the corporate form when a corporation's structure, or its manner of
conducting affairs, indicates that the corporation acted as an adjunct, or
mere instrumentality, of the other." The doctrine often arises in the par-
ent-subsidiary context. A court may hold a subsidiary entity a mere in-
strumentality when the parent corporation exercises a requisite level of
control. Such control is "not mere majority or complete stock control, but
complete domination, not only of finances, but of policy and business
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity
as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will, or existence
of its own."'
The inequitable injury redressed through piercing will typically con-
sist of one or more of the following situations:
(1) The creditors' reliance on the collective credit of the entities; (2)
The misappropriation of the assets of one entity by another or the in-
currence of liabilities by one entity for the benefit of another; (3) The
failure to maintain proper corporate formalities; (4) The operation of
the entities as one enterprise; (5) The intentional evasion of specific
legal obligations; or (6) The undercapitalization of an entity.n
(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest
of the subsidiary but take their orders from the parent corporation in the latter's interest.
(k) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed.
Id.
21. See, e.g., Middleton, 707 So. 2d at 456 (listing five primary factors to consider to deter-
mine the appropriateness of veil piercing: "1) commingling of corporate and shareholder funds; 2)
failure to follow statutory formalities for incorporating and transacting corporate affairs; 3) under-
capitalization; 4) failure to provide separate bank accounts and booking records; and 5) failure to
hold regular shareholder and director meetings") (quoting Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 590 So.2d
1164, 1168 (La. 1991)); Glenn v. Wagner, 329 S.E.2d 326, 330-31 (N.C. 1985) (listing the four
primary factors for deciding whether to disregard the corporate entity under the instrumentality rule
as: "(1) inadequate capitalization; (2) noncompliance with corporate formalities; (3) complete domi-
nation and control of the corporation so that it has no independent identity; and (4) excessive frag-
mentation of a single enterprise into separate corporations." (citations omitted)).
22. See Smith v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Broussard
v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 349 (4th Cir. 1998). The two doctrines are
distinguished by the controlling figure of the corporation in question, "alter ego" refers to one which
is controlled by an actual person, whereas "mere instrumentality" refers to a corporation controlled
by another corporation. Cf Boyce L Graham, Comment, Navigating the Mists of Metaphor: An
Examination of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 56 J, AiR L. & COM. 1135, 1140-42
(1991).
23. See Broussard, 155 F.3d at 349.
24. See id. (citing Glenn, 329 S.E.2d at 330 (stating three elements of the "instrumentality
rule" for determining whether to pierce the corporate veil: (1) the domination and control of the
corporate entity; (2) the use of that domination and control to perpetuate a fraud or wrong; and (3)
the proximate causation of the wrong complained of by the domination or control)); see also Smith,
135 F.3d at 786.
25. Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 381, 426 (1998). The third and fourth elements require classification. Some note that the
failure to maintain corporate formalities typically does not result in injury to any particular individ-
ual. See id. at 432. Rather than focusing on the direct injury, courts may use a retributive rationale,
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The veil piercing cases heard by the Tenth Circuit during the survey pe-
riod dealt with evasion of specific obligations through the manipulative
use of the corporate form. ' Creation of a corporation solely to avoid the
effects of applicable laws or regulation may lead the courts to pierce the
veil. 7
Other courts have previously found, under circumstances resem-
bling those encountered in Floyd and LW.G., such manipulative use of
the corporate form to evade legal obligations. For example, under facts
similar to those alleged in Floyd,2 the Ninth Circuit held transferring
assets between a corporation and an individual to evade the individual's
tax liability constituted an inappropriate use of the corporate form.' Un-
der facts similar to those alleged in L W.G., ° the Ninth Circuit held the
formation of a successor corporation, which continued the same business
as the original corporation for the purpose of evading obligations of the
original corporation, was also an inappropriate manipulation of the cor-
porate form.'
A choice of law issue may arise in veil piercing cases due to the
state's ability to adopt "widely divergent and sometimes contradictory"
based on the "concept that a corporate charter is a privilege granted by the state and that such privi-
lege should be revoked when the rules are not followed and the corporate form abused." Id. at 433.
The fourth element refers to enterprise theory, which justifies piercing based solely on a high degree
of unity, without requiring additional proof of unfair injury arising from such unity. See id. at 435.
The inequity may be implied through "the failure to attach the consequences of the enterprise's
action to the enterprise as a whole." Id.
26. See Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 1998); NLRB v. LW.G., Inc., 144 F.3d 685
(10th Cir. 1998).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1998); NLRB
v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993); White Oak Coal Co., Inc., 318
NLRB 732 (1995).
28. See Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1296-97.
29. See, e.g., Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS, 999 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating
that a corporate entity may be pierced when used to evade taxes); Century Hotels v. United States,
952 F.2d 107, 112 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the shareholders "used the corporate form for illegiti-
mate ends. They did so to enjoy the material benefits of the world without having to bear its tax
burden.").
30. SeeI.W.G., 144 F.3d at 687.
31. See, e.g., NRLB v. O'Neill, 965 F.2d 1522, 1531 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving the creation of
several corporations to avoid labor obligations while continuing operation of the corporations);
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco-Chem, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (involving
situation where controlling shareholder dissolved corporation in anticipation of patent infringement
liability); Culinary Workers & Bartenders Union v. Gateway Cafd, Inc., 588 P.2d 1334, 1343 (Wash.
1979) (involving situation where corporation dissolved and transferred assets to affiliate to avoid
obligations under settlement agreement). Other examples include the formation of a separate corpo-
ration to undertake a high-risk enterprise to isolate liability and the participation in otherwise pro-
hibited activities (i.e., barred by statute, regulation or order). Cf., e.g., In re Phillips Petroleum Secs.
Litig., 738 F. Supp. 825, 839 (D. Del. 1990) (stating subsidiary was merely an alter ego for parent,
created to insulate the parent corporation from possible securities fraud liability); Parker v. Bell
Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (involving the creation of a separate
entity to maximize the limitation of liability for asbestos litigation); United States v. Thomas, 515 F.
Supp. 1351, 1357 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (involving attempted evasion of medicare recoupment statute).
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corporate law standards 32 and disparate doctrinal application (between
federal and state law) by federal courts.3 Generally, the federal govern-
ment, and in turn, the federal courts, defer to state regulation of corporate
law.' In the case of interpreting federal statutes, however, the federal
courts have underscored that veil piercing may require reference to fed-
eral common law." Regardless, federal courts will often use state law for
guidance.' These circumstances have led to controversy over whether a
uniform federal common law test for piercing the corporate veil should
apply.
37
The remainder of this survey, although frequently revisiting these
traditional components of standard veil piercing, focuses more on non-
traditional veil piercing circumstances. In Floyd v. Internal Revenue
Service' the Tenth Circuit addressed reverse piercing in an alter ego
32. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES 283 (6th ed. 1997); Note, supra note 12, at 855. Some states have more
liberal requirements than others for piercing the corporate veil. For example, some jurisdictions
require fraud or inequitable result, while other jurisdictions will disregard the corporate entity based
only on a finding of excessive unity of interest alone. Cf., e.g., Huard v. Shreveport Pirates, Inc., 147
F.3d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1998) (waiving limited liability if the corporate form is disregarded by
shareholders or used for fraud). But cf Thrift Drug, Inc. v. Universal Prescription Adm'rs., 131 F.3d
95, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying New York law, the court required demonstration of complete
domination used to commit fraud or wrong that caused the injury which was the subject of the com-
pliant); see also Daniel G. Brown, Comment, Jurisdiction over a Corporation on the Basis of the
Contacts of an Affiliated Corporation: Do You Have to Pierce the Corporate Veil?, 61 U. CIN. L.
REv. 595, 601 (1992).
33. See Note, supra note 12, at 857-61.
34. See id. at 855-59, 861-62. State law may not control the veil piercing analysis when
federal law applies. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1093 (1st Cir.
1983) ("The corporate form is a creation of state law and states may impose stringent limitations on
attempts to disregard it .... These limitations, however, do not constrict a federal statute regulating
interstate commerce for the purpose of effectuating certain social policies."); see also Sebastopol
Meat Co. v. Secretary of Agric., 440 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1971) (noting the inadequacy of the
corporate form to prohibit compliance with a federal regulatory agency, and that state limitations on
the alter ego doctrine may be inapplicable); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 565 (2d
Cir. 1956) (noting the corporate form may be disregarded to further a federal regulatory statute's
purpose).
35. See NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating
veil piercing is subject to federal law when it arises from a federal labor dispute); see also Bufco
Corp. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting the NLRB typically applies a federal
common law test). Application of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) is another situation in which this question arises, however, the Supreme
Court has not yet addressed whether federal or state law should apply in such circumstances. See
United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1886 n.9 (1998) (noting that, because the parties did not
raise that issue, the Court would not decide it).
36. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1886 n.9.
37. See id. (noting the significant disagreement among courts and commentators over whether,
in enforcing CERCLA's indirect liability, courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal
common law of veil piercing).
38. 151 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 1998) (involving creditors who sought personal liability of the
founder of three corporations).
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context. In National Labor Relations Board v. L W.G., Inc.39 the court
addressed the alter ego doctrine in a case involving evasion of obliga-
tions for unfair labor practices.
II. REVERSE PIERCING
A. Background
Reverse piercing occurs when either a corporate insider or a person
suing a corporate insider attempts to merge the separate legal identities
of the corporation and the corporate insider. ' In contrast, standard veil
piercing typically involves a creditor of the corporation who seeks pay-
ment from shareholders." Courts may distinguish reverse piercing claims
as either "inside" or "outside" cases, depending on the position of the
person arguing for disregard of the corporate form.'
Most reverse piercing cases involve inside reverse piercing."3 Inside
reverse piercing occurs when a dominant shareholder or corporate insider
argues for the disregard of the corporate form in the process of seeking,
for example, access to corporate claims against third parties, or protec-
tion of corporate assets from third party claims against the insider." In
inside cases, the third party (often a corporate creditor or debtor) would
object to the merger of the corporation and the individual. ' Accordingly,
the third party's wrongful act may justify the reverse pierce.'
Bitar v. Wakim" illustrates inside reverse piercing. Bitar suffered
injuries from a slip and fall accident while on the job." Wakim was the
president and sole shareholder of Beirut Bakery, Inc., the corporation
that employed Bitar." The corporation leased the property from Wakim,
who owned and maintained the property in his own name.' Wakim
sought inside reverse piercing to hold himself and the corporation as the
same entity.' If considered one entity, he could rely upon the exclusive
39. 144 F.3d 685 (10th Cir. 1998).
40. See Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16
J. CORP. L. 33, 36 (1990); see, e.g., Hovis v. United Screen Printers Inc. (In re Elkay Industries
Inc.), 167 B.R. 404, 410 (D. S.C. 1994) (stating that debtor's estate wanted debts of subsidiary
included as a debt of parent to avoid preferential payment utilizing reverse piercing).
41. See Gevurtz, supra note 14, at 905.
42. See Crespi, supra note 40, at 36-37.
43. See id. at 37.
44. Cf.id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 51.
47. 572 N.W.2d 191 (Mich. 1998).
48. See Bitar, 572 N.W.2d at 191.
49. See id
50. See id. at 191-92.
51. See id. at 192.
1999]
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remedy provision of worker's disability compensation to shield him from
personal liability. 2
The Michigan Supreme Court refused to reverse pierce, leaving
Wakim with possible personal liability. 3 Noting that the president "chose
to maintain the property in his own name and to lease it to the corpora-
tion" to gain the advantages offered by the corporate form, the court
found no equitable basis for a reverse piercing of the corporate veil.' The
court stated, "those who create, and take advantage of, a corporate
structure should not be allowed to disregard that structure when it suits
their purposes."" This notion that the owners should not "have it both
ways" often provides grounds for dismissal of reverse piercing claims
brought by corporation owners.'
Outside reverse piercing, which occurs less often than inside reverse
piercing, typically involves a third party suing a corporate insider and
attempting to disregard the corporate form to gain access to a corpora-
tion's assets. 7 Here; the insider and the corporation object to the merger
of the two entities." Courts look to the wrongful conduct of the corporate
insider or the corporation to justify the piercing 9 Courts often reject out-
side reverse piercing, however, upon a showing that not all of the share-
holders were involved in the conduct. Courts reason that allowing a re-
verse pierce in such a circumstance results in unfair prejudice to those
parties not involved in the wrongful conduct.'
Perhaps due to the fact that reverse piercing seems to contradict tra-
ditional corporate law notions of limited liability, courts are often reluc-
tant to apply the reverse piercing doctrine' This hesitancy can be traced
back to Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlin Transportation Co.,62
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 193.
55. Id.
56. Michael J. Gaertner, Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation
Owners Have It Both Ways?, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667, 668 (1989) (quoting In re Beck Indus.,
479 F.2d 410,418 (2d Cir. 1974)).
57. See Crespi, supra note 40, at 37.
58. See id. at 36.
59. See id. at 51.
60. See id. at 65.
61. A court's willingness to accept a reverse piercing claim may depend on the nature of the
underlying cause of action. See David M. Grimes, Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil, 13 No. 5
BANKR. STRATEGIST 1, 2-3 (1996). The majority of receivership and bankruptcy decisions, for
example, hold that reverse veil piercing "is a valid cause of action." Id. at 2. Other courts recognize
reverse piercing only in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Stoebner v. Lingenfelter, 115 F.3d 576, 580
n.4 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Minnesota law); Flight Servs. Group, Inc. v. Patten Corp., 963 F. Supp.
158, 160 (D. Conn. 1997). A number of courts have rejected the doctrine outright. See Grimes,
supra, at 3.
62. 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929).
[Vol. 76:3
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the first case to address outside reverse piercing. In rejecting the doc-
trine, Judge Learned Hand stated:
Perhaps it would be too much to say that a subsidiary can never be li-
able for a transaction done in the name of the parent, the situation at
bar. Any person may use another as a screen, and one may conceive
cases where such an arrangement might exist. But such instances, if
possible at all, must be extremely rare, and there is not the slightest
evidence of the sort here. Although it is quite true that the two com-
panies were very intimately related, the [subsidiary] never intended in
fact to make the [parent] its agent, nor did it interpose in any way in
the conduct of its affairs. Rather their relations were reversed, so that
the [subsidiary] could not have interposed, whatever might be the li-
ability of the [parent] for the transactions formally undertaken by the
[subsidiary] .63
No court re-addressed outside reverse piercing until 1957." This time,
however, the court in question was more receptive, allowing outside re-
verse piercing to occur in a marital property case.' Over the next forty
years litigators used the doctrine intermittently with varying degrees of
success, however, Judge Learned Hand's notion of proceeding cautiously
consistently endured.'
Prior to the survey period, the Tenth Circuit addressed reverse
piercing on two occasions-both times rejecting the doctrine.' The mat-
ter first arose in Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks," a dispute
over financial responsibility for the expenditures related to a joint ven-
ture for the development of a gold mine. ' Weston was the mine's princi-
ple promoter and Cascade was the managing agent for the joint venture."0
Weston, Cascade, and numerous entities affiliated with Weston were
responsible for the mine's development and production operations." In
1980, the investors purchased working interests in the gold mine.' The
63. Kingston, 31 F.2d at 267.
64. See Crespi, supra note 40, at 57.
65. See W.G. Platts, Inc. v. Platts, 298 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Wash. 1956) (holding in favor of the
wife in a marital property case, the court found that the husband and corporation acted as alter egos
and upheld a lien attached to a corporation's property where corporation was controlled by the
husband).
66. See Crespi, supra note 40, at 57--64 (giving a detailed description of the cases dealing with
outside reverse piercing).
67. Cf Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1998); Cascade Energy & Metals
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1579 (10th Cir. 1990).
68. 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990) (involving a dispute over a gold mine between the mine's
principle promoters and a group of investors). During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit heavily
relied upon Cascade in its reverse veil piercing analysis employed in Floyd.
69. See Cascade, 896 F.2d at 1561.
70. See id. at 1562.
71. See id. at 1564.
72. See id.
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venture was initially funded with promissory notes and a development
loan .73
By 1982, the money from the development loan was depleted, and
Weston assessed investors to pay additional costs.' Some investors, con-
cerned by the lack of gold production, drew from the mine.7' The results
indicated the mine contained little gold, and the material Cascade had
mined was a low quality ore. 6 Ultimately, Weston, Cascade, and the
other Weston affiliated entities sued the investors for the additional de-
velopment costs, and the investors counter-claimed for fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and securities violations.
77
The trial court applied Utah law,' and reverse pierced the veils of
four entities deemed alter egos of Weston and Cascade.' It held them
jointly and severally liable for the damages, which included the wrong-
fully collected assessments for the additional development costs, misap-
propriated funds from the joint venture, and the investors' attorney's
fees.' The court primarily based its decision on the fact that Weston had
almost total control of the four entities, particularly with respect to their
finances."'
On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed, denying the outside
reverse piercing claim.' First, the court defined the purpose of allowing
incorporation as an isolation of liabilities. 3 Consequently, veil piercing
should only occur when done "reluctantly and cautiously." Second, the
Utah Supreme Court had not clearly adopted the reverse piercing doc-
trine, much less outside reverse piercing." Third, noting that contract
73. See id. at 1564-65. The income and cash flow projections put forth in the offering memo-
randum for the working interests forecasted that the mine's operating profits would satisfy the
promissory notes and a development loan, thus additional cash contributions from the investors
would not be required for repayment. The mine, however, immediately had problems, and Weston
changed the mining techniques, which also were not fruitful. See id.
74. See id. at 1565.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id at 1566.
78. See id. at 1575 n.18.
79. See id. at 1576.
80. See id at 1566-67.
81. See id at 1576. The court noted:
(1) Weston dominated the boards of directors and the management of the four entities; (2)
Weston was "single-handedly" able to transfer assets among the various entities and did
so; and (3) Weston commingled the funds of the various entities in the sense that when he
transferred funds from one entity to another, the funds were deposited in the receiving





85. See id. at 1576-77. The court stated this was a special "variant" of the reverse pierce in
that an outsider, rather than an insider, was asserting the claim, and special problems resulted. Id. at
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creditors and tort creditors differed in their consensual nature, the court
expressed reservation against piercing in voluntary contract situations.'
Fourth, although Weston used the entities for personal objectives, he still
maintained and held the entities out as separate organizations.' Fifth,
under Utah law, veil piercing requires more than just unity of interest
alone;"5 instead, the claimants must show the relationship between the
injury and either the unity of interest or their reliance on the corpora-
tion's lack of separateness.9 The claimants failed to demonstrate either of
these scenarios.'
Subsequent to Cascade, both state and federal courts expressed
hesitancy to apply the reverse piercing doctrine.9 During the survey pe-
riod, the Tenth Circuit confronted reverse piercing in Floyd v. Internal
Revenue Service,' and consistent with earlier pronouncements, rejected
the doctrine."
B. Tenth Circuit Decision: Floyd v. Internal Revenue Service'
1. Facts
In Floyd, a group of creditors sought to use corporate assets to sat-
isfy a corporate shareholder's debt. The debtor, Thomas Bridges, had
founded and exercised complete control over three companies, Network
Billing Centers, Inc. (NBC), Med-Net Technologies, Inc. (Med-Net), and
Thomas Marketing, Inc. (TMI)." Bridges acted as the sole shareholder
and director of all three companies." Three creditors (the IRS, the State
of Kansas, and the "Floyd plaintiffs") obtained judgments against
Bridges.' All three fought for priority over two groups of assets: the pro-
1575 n.17, 1576-77. The traditional theories listed were "conversion, fraudulent conveyance of
assets, respondeat superior and agency law." Id. at 1577.
86. See id.




91. See, e.g., Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1990) (declining to
apply outside reverse piercing in a case seeking to seize corporate assets to satisfy the tax liability of
the beneficial owners); Transarnerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24,
26-27 (Utah 1990) (declining to apply outside reverse piercing, the Utah Supreme Court imposed a
special limitation on the alter ego theory when used to allow creditors of controlling insiders to
attach the corporation's asset and required the claimant to show that the "corporation itself played a
role in the inequitable conduct at issue").
92. 151 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 1998).
93. See Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1300 (stating that "in the absence of a clear statement of Kansas
law by the Kansas courts, we will not assume that such a potentially problematic doctrine already
has application in that state") (citing Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577
(10th Cir. 1990)).
94. 151 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 1998).
95. Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1296.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1296-97.
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ceeds from the sale of a house" and the attached accounts of the compa-
nies."
The IRS sought to establish that Med-Net acted as an alter ego of
Bridges in order to hold Med-Net liable for Bridges' personal debt, and
thereby allow utilization of corporate assets to satisfy Bridges' debt.'"
The district court engaged in outside reverse piercing when it found that
Med-Net acted as Bridges' alter ego and subsequently granted the IRS
priority over the two other creditors, entitling the IRS to the corpora-
tion's assets.'"' On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered, in the context of
an alter ego theory, whether the IRS could pierce Med-Net's veil and use
corporate assets to satisfy Bridges' tax obligations.'"
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court erred
in accepting the IRS's alter ego argument.'" The court noted that for the
purposes of outside reverse veil piercing, Kansas state law (as opposed to
federal law) should determine whether Med-Net acted as Bridges alter
ego.'" Kansas courts, however, had not yet spoken on the issue,'" and the
Tenth Circuit found significant reasons to resist the claim.'" While the
court recognized precedent authorizing piercing of the corporate veil, it
distinguished standard and reverse veil piercing." The court established
that reverse piercing deserved different treatment because reverse pierc-
ing holds the corporation liable for the debts or torts of its controlling
shareholders.'" In the instant case, because a party outside the corpora-
98. See id. The house had been purchased primarily with Med-Net funds in 1992, the legal
title was to pass from the construction company to Bridges's daughter, Brook Bridges McBride,
upon full payment under a contract for deed. See id. at 1297. Both Bridges and McBride lived in the
house. See id.
99. See id. at 1296.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1297-98. The lower court based its determination that Med-Net was the alter ego
of Bridges on Pemco Inc. v. Kansas Department of Revenue, 907 P.2d 863, 867 (Kan. 1995). See
Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1298 (citing Pemco).
102. See id at 1298.
103. See id. at 1300 (deciding not to apply a doctrine which the Kansas courts had not expressly
adopted). Additionally, the court stated that the taxation context of the government's claim did not
dictate the outcome in terms of priority of claims, but rather, the IRS as any other creditor seeking
veil piercing. See id. at 1299.
104. See id. at 1298 (citing Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS, 999 F.2d' 1387, 1391 (9th Cir.
1993)).
105. See id. at 1298-99.
106. See id. at 1299.
107. See id. at 1298 (holding that the facts of Pemco involved "standard" veil piercing and thus




tion, the IRS, wanted to treat the shareholder and the corporation as one,
additional complications arose."
As the court delineated, the theory posed several problems as ap-
plied to the facts of this case. First, it by-passed "normal judgment-
collection procedures.""' Second, unfair prejudice may result to third
parties if a creditor (in this instance, the IRS) was able to directly attach a
corporation's assets."' Such a scenario, the court argued, could ultimately
lead to greater culpability for third party corporate creditors harmed by
reverse piercing."2 Third, reverse piercing could unsettle corporate
creditors' expectations regarding securing loans with corporate assets."'
Fourth, it could reduce the corporate forms' effectiveness in raising
credit." This would result from corporate creditors demand for compen-
sation for the increased risk of default from outside reverse-piercing
claims."' Fifth, the case did not involve the situation for outside reverse
piercing."6 The court stated that, only where a subsidiary dominated its
parent, should courts find outside reverse piercing appropriate."' Sixth, as
an equitable remedy, disregarding the corporate form required the un-
availability of adequate remedies at law."' Possible alternative remedies
to consider included: (1) an agency or aiding and abetting theory, (2)
standard judgment collection procedures, and (3) in taxation cases, the
transfer of an economic benefit to a shareholder may be reachable for tax
purposes as a constructive dividend."9 The court concluded by holding
that the district court inappropriately applied the reverse piercing doc-
trine to attach liability.2 '
C. Other Circuits
During the survey period one other circuit dealt with reverse veil
piercing. The Third Circuit, in Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago,
Inc.,'2' effectively used the derivative injury rule, which prevents a share-
holder from suing for personal injuries that result directly from injuries
to the corporation, to reject an inside-piercing claim."2 Kaplan, the corpo-
109. See id. Thus this case represents a classic example of outside reverse piercing of the corpo-
rate veil. See id.







116. See id. at 1299-1300 (citing Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31
F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J)).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1300.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. 143 F.3d 807 (3d Cir. 1998).
122. See Kaplan, 143 F.3d at 811-12.
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ration's sole shareholder, sought reverse veil piercing to recover indi-
vidually for losses the corporation suffered as a result of the actions of
First Options of Chicago.'" The court noted the sole shareholder chose to
receive the benefits of structuring his business in the corporate form."
As the court determined that Kaplan and the corporation in question were
separate entities, the derivative injury rule prevented Kaplan, the sole
shareholder, from reverse piercing the corporate veil to recover individu-
ally for the corporation's losses.'" The rule would not, however, bar
Kaplan's claims if he sought to recover for injuries inflicted on him indi-
vidually rather than on the corporation."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit, in Floyd, added to the concerns addressed in
Cascade. Floyd also clarified the issues that require attention before
courts should adopt reverse veil piercing. The court seemed to balance
the potential negative effects of using this theory with the alternatives
available to resolve the issue. Floyd noted the existence of numerous
other theories available to hold the shareholder liable.
In one sense, the Tenth Circuit decision in Floyd adhered to Judge
Learned Hand's admonition to proceed cautiously. On closer inspection,
however, the decision went much further: it effectively rejected the doc-
trine until directed otherwise by the Kansas State Supreme Court. The
court extensively discussed the litany of potential problems with reverse
piercing, but primarily emphasized that, as a federal court, it declined to
dictate or influence Kansas corporate law. Nevertheless, while the
court's stated purpose in effect only lent more weight to Cascade's con-
clusion, the decision effectively precluded utilization of a doctrine ac-
cepted by many other jurisdictions.'"
123. Seeid at811.
124. See id at 812.
125. See id. (citing Kagan v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the plaintiffs could not obtain both "limited liability for debts incurred in the corporate name,
and direct compensation for its losses")).
126. See id.
127. See id. The traditional notions of limited liability within corporate law also provide insight
to the courts' resistance to piercing. See Gaertner, supra note 56, at 667. The objective in reverse
piercing aims to make the "corporation owner and the corporation become one legal entity when the
legal line of demarcation between the entities becomes virtually nonexistent," essentially holding the
corporation liable for the owner's actions. Id.; see supra Part I (stating that reverse piercing conflicts
with the fundamental principle of separateness of entities and limited liability).
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III. PIERCING JUSTIFIED BY EVASION OF LEGAL OBLIGATION OR BY
WRONGFUL ACTS
A. Background
Not all veil piercing cases involve judgment proof corporations."
Courts sometimes utilize the piercing doctrine when owners intentionally
use the corporate form to evade a specific obligation. '2 It is firmly estab-
lished that a court may disregard the corporate form to "prevent fraud,
illegality or injustice or when the recognition of the corporate entity
would defeat public policy or shield someone from liability for a
crime."'" Courts may also disregard the separateness of a corporate entity
when an owner used the corporate form to defeat legislative policies or
circumvent provisions of a statute."'
As discussed in Part I, the choice of law issue potentially could effect
the outcome of a case. When the veil piercing claim stems from an area
of federal preeminence, the courts may apply the federal common law
test for piercing, rather than a particular state's.32 Recently courts have
encountered this issue involving violations under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA)."3 They have also done so in cases involving violations of
federal labor laws. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) has the power to "hold a corporation's officers or owners person-
ally liable for violations of the [National Labor Relations] Act when the
corporate form is used to perpetuate fraud, evade existing obligations, or
circumvent a statute. '' 34
128. The Louisiana Court of Appeals stated that although veil piercing is usually used to "im-
pose personal liability on corporate shareholders for corporate debts, this is a flexible doctrine that
can be used in any situation in which the separate personality of the corporation appears to be
blocking a just result." Middleton, 707 So. 2d at 456; see Gevurtz, supra note 14, at 905-07.
129. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
130. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 45; see also Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362
n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Zubick v. Zubick, 348 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1967)); cf John E. Tobin,
Responsibility of the Corporate Parent for Activities of a Subsidiary: Advising the Corporate Parent
Before Litigation, 520 PRACr. L. INST. 129, 129 (1986).
131. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,630
(1983) (refusing to give the corporate form effect where it has been used to defeat legislative poli-
cies); Casanova Guns, Inc. v. Connally, 454 F.2d 1320, 1322 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing Anderson v.
Abbot, 321 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1944), in stating that "it is well settled that the fiction of a corporate
entity must be disregarded whenever it has been adopted or used to circumvent the provisions of a
statute").
132. See NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1990); supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998)
(involving CERCLA case seeking to hold shareholder personally liable as operator); see also infra
notes 196-98 and accompanying text (discussing Bestfoods).
134. Schmitz Meat, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 554 (1993) (referring to violations of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)); see Bufco Corp. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 964, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding
the National Labor Relations Board's piercing of the corporate veil).
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Numerous cases illustrate a willingness to pierce the corporate veil to
impose personal liability for unfair labor practices and other unlawful
employment practices, such as employment discrimination." Where an
owner creates a corporation solely to avoid the effects of applicable laws
or regulations regarding unfair labor practices, courts may employ the
alter ego theory to justify disregarding of the corporate form. 36 The court
may engage in veil piercing and hold the individual shareholders liable
for the corporation's unfair labor practices if (1) the shareholder did not
maintain separate identities; (2) the shareholder personally participated in
the fraud, injustice, or inequity; and (3) failure to pierce sanctioned fraud,
promoted injustice, or allowed evasion of legal obligations.'37 Similarly,
where a parent corporation exercises a substantial degree of control and
the parent attempts to make the subsidiary nonunion, the parent company
and its insolvent subsidiary act as a single employer.3 s Thus the parent
faces liability for backpay owed by the subsidiary for unfair labor prac-
tices.'39
The willingness to pierce the corporate form when an entity uses that
form to evade legal obligations almost always comports with the "ineq-
uitable" or "unjust result" requirement of the veil piercing doctrine. Ap-
propriately, however, each prong of the unity/inequity test plays an im-
portant role, and neither unity of interest nor the evasion of legal obliga-
tion alone is sufficient to pierce in such a situation." Two Tenth Circuit
cases, NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing'' and NLRB v. I.W.G.,
Inc., 2 illustrate this reality.
In NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing,' 3 the Tenth Circuit applied
the federal common law test and refused to pierce the corporate veil un-
less both prongs of the test were met." Greater Kansas City Roofing
(GKC), a sole proprietorship, committed unfair labor practices, and the
135. See, e.g., NLRB v. O'Neill, 965 F.2d 1522, 1524, 1529 (9th Cir. 1992) (piercing appropri-
ate where an owner closed operations, then later resumed them under new corporations, in order to
evade labor obligations); Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 61 (4th Cir. 1989) (imposing li-
ability on parent for subsidiary's liability for employment discrimination).
136. See United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1998) (involving
liability for fines imposed for criminal violations); NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d
1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding NLRB could not pierce veil without evidence that the corpo-
rate form was used to promote fraud or that the owner's disregard of the separate corporate existence
led to injustice or the evasion of a legal obligation); White Oak Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 732 (1995)
(finding the owners personally liable for corporate violations).
137. See White Oak Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. at 732.
138. Package Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 845, 845-46, 848 (8th Cir. 1997).
139. See Package Serv. Co., 113 F.3d at 845-46.
140. See Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1054-55.
141. 2 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1993).
142. NLRB v. I.W.G., Inc., 144 F.3d 685 (10th Cir. 1998).
143. 2 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the NLRB could not pierce the veil without
evidence that the corporate form was used to promote fraud or that the owner's disregard of the
separate corporate existence led to injustice or the evasion of a legal obligation).
144. See Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1055.
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NLRB ordered it to make payments."5 The proprietor's sister-in-law,
Tina Clarke, loaned money to GKC to pay its debts.'4 Later, Clarke
formed New Greater Kansas City Roofing (New GKC) unaware of
GKC's liability for the unfair labor practices. "7 Clarke acted as New
GKC's sole shareholder, officer, and director and failed to adhere to cor-
porate formalities.'" In many ways New GKC caried on aspects of
GKCs business." Alleging that New GKC and GKC were alter egos, the
NLRB sought to hold New GKC liable for the payments, attempting to
pierce New GKC's corporate veil to hold Clarke personally liable.'" An
administrative law judge found New GKC liable, but refused to attach
personal liability to Clarke through the operation of the veil piercing
doctrine.'
On administrative appeal, the NLRB disagreed and held Clarke per-
sonally liable for the judgment.' The Board declined to limit its ability
to pierce the corporate veil only to those cases that involved fraud.' 3 The
Board accepted that Clarke "was not acting fraudulently or with any in-
tent to violate the labor laws or to avoid payment of the preexisting
backpay order.'"" Nevertheless, it found her liable "solely because of the
intermingling of her affairs with those of New GKC and her failure to
observe corporate formalities."'"5
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, however, denied enforcement against
Clarke.' 6 The court stated that federal law applied to the question of
"whether a company or individual is responsible for the financial obliga-
tions of another company or individual" when the question arose in the
federal labor dispute context.'57 Further, as an equitable action, piercing
the veil applied only in circumstances involving obvious impropriety or
injustice. 8
The court characterized the alter ego theory as a two-part test.'59 First,
"was there such unity of interest and lack of respect given to the separate
145. See id. at 1049.





151. See id. The AL found that Clarke "did not so intermingle her affairs with that of New
GKC to justify ignoring the corporate boundaries," and that "Clarke did not use the corporate status
of New GKC 'to perpetrate fraud, evade existing obligations, or circumvent a statute."' Id. (quoting
the AU's supplemental decision).







159. See id. at 1052.
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identity of the corporation by its shareholders that the personalities and
assets of the corporation and the individual are indistinct."" Second,
"would adherence to the corporate fiction sanction a fraud, promote in-
justice, or lead to an evasion of legal obligations."'' The court further
underscored that the inequity justifying the pierce must result from the
corportite form's misuse."2
The court found no evidence of fraud with respect to Clarke's failure
to follow corporate formalities." Nor did the court find that the NLRB
adequately proved Clarke used New GKC to work an injustice." The
court noted that Clarke formed New GKC "long after the unfair labor
practices had occurred."'65 Further, the NLRB did not link Clarke's style
of conducting business to "any fraud, injury or injustice to the former
employees of GKC or their union with regard to the unfair labor prac-
tices that gave rise to this backpay order."" Thus, the court held the
piercing constituted clear error and denied enforcement of the NLRB
order.67
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit also addressed the appli-
cation of the alter ego doctrine to an attempt to evade legal obligations in
National Labor Relations Board v. L W.G., Inc." This case evidences the
courts' continued opposition to veil piercing absent facts clearly satisfy-
ing both prongs of the federal common law test."
B. Tenth Circuit Case: National Labor Relations Board v. I.W.G., Inc.'"°
1. Facts
The Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union filed charges which spurred
an investigation by the NLRB.'"' Based on the investigation, the Board
filed a complaint alleging that two corporations (I.W.G and Con-Bru)
and the owner (Gordon) acted as a single employer or alter egos. 2 The
Board alleged that a third corporation (Arlene), was the successor to
160. Id. To determine the degree to which the personalities and assets Inerged, the court should
consider to what extent the parties (1) complied with corporate legal formalities, and (2) commin-
gled the assets and affairs of the individual and the corporation. See id.
161. Id. Under this prong, the court should consider whether adequate justification to invoke
the court's equitable power. See id.
162. See id. at 1053.





168. 144 F.3d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1998).
169. Cf. L WG., 144F.3d at 689.
170. 144 F.3d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1998):




I.W.G./Con-Bru.' 7 An administrative law judge heard and decided the
case, which the Board adopted with slight modification.'7" The NLRB
found that Gordon created, then subsequently abandoned in succession,
three corporations (I.W.G., Con-Bru, and Arlene), "primarily to avoid
paying his employees pursuant to an extant collective-bargaining agree-
ment and to evade a statutory obligation to bargain with the Union over
the terms and conditions of employment."'" The Board held Gordon per-
sonally liable for Arlene's unfair labor practices and pierced the veils of
all three corporations. 176
Gordon claimed the unfair labor practice complaint did not allege an
alter ego claim against Arlene.1" Insufficient notice, therefore, created a
procedural impediment to the Board's finding that Arlene constituted an
alter ego of I.W.G. and Con-Bru.'" The NLRB contended that regardless
of whether it specifically pled the alter ego claim, the parties fully and
fairly litigated the claim, thereby making the decision proper.' When the
case came before the Tenth Circuit, the NRLB sought enforcement of the
order and Gordon sought review of the portion of the NLRB order hold-
ing him liable for the unfair laborpractices of the corporations.'"
2. Decision
The court found that the NLRB alter ego claim against Arlene was
neither sufficiently charged nor litigated at the hearing. 8' The court em-
phasized that the respondent must have understood the issue and had the
opportunity to justify its position. Therefore, the court held that the
Board's decision regarding notice of the claim violated Gordon's due
process rights.'
The court reiterated that the decision to pierce a corporate veil was a
question of law.' The court would give "great weight" to the Board's
determination that the facts justified piercing and would uphold that de-
173. See id. at 685. Arlene had notice of the potential liability for unfair labor practices thus
qualified as a Golden State successor potentially liable for the predecessor's liability. See Golden
State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184-85 (1973).







181. See id. at 689-90.
182. See id. at 688. It was not necessary for Gordon to identify specific unconsidered evidence
to contravene the Arlene alter ego theory because the complete lack of notice rendered Gordon's
counsel unable to defend against the unannounced claim through steps at the evidentiary hearing.
See id. at 689.
183. See id. at 687.
184. See id. at 689.
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termination when made within "reasonable bounds."'"3 The court noted
that the Board's findings were conclusive when the record, considered as
a whole, offered substantial evidence to support the finding.'"
In this case, however, because the "unlitigated conclusion that
Arlene is a single employer alter ego of I.W.G. and Con-Bru" provided a
substantial part of the basis for piercing, the court of appeals determined
that it could not accurately review the Board's veil piercing analysis."7
The Tenth Circuit stated that the lower court erred by not applying the
two-prong Greater Kansas City Roofing analysis to each corporation
individually, rather than combining evidence of all three corporations'
operations to justify the piercing."8 Accordingly, the court remanded the
issue of Gordon's personal liability to the Board for analysis consistent
with the court's opinion."
C. Other Circuits
Three other circuits have dealt with non-traditional veil piercing in
the context of imposition of liability for evasion of legal obligations. In
Donahey v. Bogle,"'9 the Sixth Circuit refused to pierce the veil in a
CERCLA case, holding that a lessee's shareholder was not liable as an
operator under CERCLA absent circumstances justifying piercing of the
corporate veil.'"' The court applied Michigan veil piercing doctrine, stat-
ing that Michigan follows the "general rule that requires demonstration
of patent abuse of the corporate form in order to pierce the corporate
veil."'" Notably, the dissent argued that by using state law the court af-
forded the savvy polluter the opportunity to protect himself from veil
piercing unless the claimant proved fraud, a difficult evidentiary standard
to meet.'" Thus, the savvy polluter could play state law against the fed-
eral policy of CERCLA, choosing to incorporate in a state with more
difficult requirements for piercing of the corporate veil.'9 ' The U.S. Su-
185. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1051 (1 Oth Cir. 1993)).




190. 129 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 1997), judgment vacated by Donahey v. Livingstone, 118 S.
Ct. 2317 (1998) (involving CERCLA case seeking to hold sole shareholder personally liable as
operator).
191. See Donahey, 129F.3d at 843.
192. Id. (citing United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 113 F.3d 572,580(6th Cir. 1997)). The
test applied requires that "such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and its owner cease to exist, and the circumstances must be such that adherence to the
fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice." Id.




preme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of United States v. Bestfoods.'"
In an opinion delivered a week before the Donahey ruling, the Su-
preme Court, in Bestfoods, essentially agreed with a Sixth Circuit deci-
sion to refuse to impose direct liability upon a parent corporation and to
require circumstances that justified veil piercing in order to impose de-
rivative CERCLA liability; however, the Court disagreed with the Sixth
Circuit's method of analysis.' In vacating and remanding, the Court
underscored that rather than focusing on the parent's relationship with
the subsidiary, the lower court should have focused on the parent's rela-
tionship with the facility.' The Court noted it would not address the is-
sue of whether state law or federal common law should dictate veil
piercing because the parties did not raise the issue.'"
In Bufco Corp. v. NLRB, '" the D.C. Circuit upheld the NLRB's deci-
sion to pierce the corporate veil, holding three individuals jointly and
severally liable for the wrongdoing of two corporations. ' The court
noted that when veil piercing arose in the context of a federal labor dis-
pute context, "the Board typically applies a test derived from the federal
common law" to determine whether to pierce.f' This two-part test con-
sists of the following inquires: "(1) have the shareholder and the corpo-
ration failed to maintain separate identities? and (2) would adherence to
the corporate structure sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or lead to an
evasion of legal obligations?"'
In United States v. Vitek Supply Corp.,' the Seventh Circuit utilized
the alter ego theory to justify disregard of the corporate form in a crimi-
nal case. ' The court demonstrated its willingness to pierce the corporate
veil to impose personal liability for criminal fines where an owner cre-
195. Donahey v. Livingstone, 118 S. Ct. 2317 (1998), vacated, United States v. Bestfoods, 118
S. Ct. 1876 (1998). In Bestoods, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeal's judgment and
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its decision. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1890.
196. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885-86.
197. See id. at 1885. The court held:
(1) when (but only when) the corporate veil may be pierced, may a parent corporation be
charged with derivative CERCLA liability for its subsidiary's actions; (2) a participation-
and-control test looking to the parent's supervision over the subsidiary, especially one
that assumes that dual officers always act on behalf of the parent, cannot be used to iden-
tify operation of a facility resulting in direct parental liability; and (3) direct parental li-
ability under CERCLA's operator provision is not limited to a corporate parent's sole or
joint venture operation with subsidiary.
Id. at 1889.
198. See id. at 1886 n.9.
199. 147 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
200. See Bufco, 147 F.3d at 969.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing White Oak Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 732 (1995)).
203. 151 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1998).
204. See Vitek Supply, 151 F.3d at 585.
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ated a corporation solely to avoid the effects of applicable laws or regu-
lations.'
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in National Labor Relations Board v.
L W.G., Inc, is consistent with Greater Kansas City Roofing. The court
made a clear statement that, while the Board's decision to pierce de-
serves "great weight" if within "reasonable bounds,"' the Board must
apply the two-prong Greater Kansas City Roofing analysis to each cor-
poration individually.' The decision reinforces the strict adherence to
the fundamental notions of the separateness of entities and limited liabil-
ity.' Injustice will not outweigh correct application of the doctrine.
Although the court has consistently refused to pierce the corporate
veil in cases dealing with federal labor laws, the facts of these cases ren-
der the decisions appropriate. In LW.G., the Board did not apply the ap-
plicable federal common law test, and the court's refusal to veil pierce
was appropriate since the record did not clearly indicate reasonable
grounds for the Board's decision. If, after application of the two-prong
test, the Board determines that Arlene, I.W.G, and Con-Bru acted as alter
egos to evade I.W.G.'s & Con-Bru's obligations, Gordon may face per-
sonal liability.' This result would be consistent with Greater Kansas
City Roofing, in that the basis for piercing would satisfy the two-prong
test-unity of interest plus the requirement that inequity resulted from
the misuse of the corporate form.
CONCLUSION
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit twice addressed piercing
the corporate veil in a non-traditional context. Both cases adhere to
precedent, adding little to the substantive law, and both refuse to disre-
gard the corporate form. The Floyd decision is notable for its thorough
discussion of reverse veil piercing and its delineation of issues that states
may consider in adopting the doctrine. The LW.G. decision is notable for
the court's insistence on the application of Greater Kansas City Roof-
ing's two-prong analysis for corporate veil piercing and the implied ac-
ceptance of piercing the corporate veil to hold an individual accountable
when a corporation is established as a means of evading previously es-
tablished legal obligations. These cases continue to demonstrate the
Tenth Circuit's respect for the corporate form and its hesitance to engage
in veil piercing unless clearly warranted by the facts of the case. When
205. See id.
206. NLRB v. I.W.G., Inc., 144 F.3d 685,689 (10th Cir. 1998).
207. See W.G., 144 F.3d at 689.
208. See Huard v. Shreveport Pirates, Inc., 147 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1998); SOLOMON &




viewed together, these cases may indicate a great resistance by the court
to pierce the corporate veil in non-traditional circumstances. At the very
least, the court firmly established that lower courts must prudently set
forth and investigate the factors justifying their disregard of the corporate
form in each instant case.
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